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Comments
PRIVATE ACTIONS FOR THE BROKER'S
"CHURNING" OF A SECURITIES ACCOUNT
The relationship between a securities broker' and his customer
contains a potential conflict of interest. On the one hand, the broker
gives advice on securities transactions, and on the other, he acts as
a salesman and derives income from the transactions on which he
gives advice.2 This potential conflict of interest becomes actual
when the broker "chums" his customer's account. "Churning" in-
volves a broker's improper attempt to derive profits for himself with
little regard for the interests of his customer.' It occurs when the
dealer induces transactions in the customer's account which are
excessive in size and frequency with respect to the character of the
account.4 Although "churning" is not established by any single rule
or formula,' it seems clear that the elements of control and excessive
trading must be established.'
I. ELEMENTS
A. The Element of Control
Overtrading of an account does not automatically establish
1. Since courts use the terms "broker" and "dealer" interchangeably, this comment
will also disregard the technical distinctions between the terms.
2. See Comment, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARv. L. REv. 869, 870 (1967). See
also Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 635, 638 (1970).
3. Stevens v. Abbott, 288 F.Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
4. Powers v. Francis DuPont & Co., 344 F.Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1972); accord, Fey v.
Waltston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974); Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d
365 (1st Cir. 1973). The American Law Institute defines churning as follows:
[Churning.] It is unlawful for a broker or dealer to effect with or for a customer
with respect to whose account he or his agent had discretionary authority, or is in
a position to determine the volume and frequency of transactions by reason of the
customer's willingness to follow his or his agent's suggestions, transactions that are
excessive in volume or frequency on the basis of such factors as the size and charac-
ter of the account, the needs and objectives of the customer as ascertained on
reasonable inquiry, the pattern of trading in the account, and the amount of profits
or commissions of the broker or dealer or his agent in relation to the size of the
acdount.
ALI FED. SEcuRrrIEs CODE § 1306, (Tentative Draft No. 2, March, 1973).
See also 3 L. Loss, SEcuxrrms REGULATION 1480 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss];
E. WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS 109-11 (1965); Comment,
Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARv. L. REv. 869 (1967).
5. Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974).
6. Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Services, 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970); Jenny v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,021, at 97,581 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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churning.' It must also be shown that the broker controlled the
account. The necessary element of control clearly exists when the
account is a formally discretionary account.' The Securities and
Exchange Commission once limited the offense of churning to such
an account.' Presently, however, the finding of the element of con-
trol is not limited to situations involving a formally discretionary
account."0 A broker is in control if he is, in effect, making the deci-
sions regarding the nature and number of transactions. In determin-
ing whether the element of control exists, the facts and circumstan-
ces of each case must be considered." Such a determination is a
factual one."
Of primary importance is evidence which bears upon the cus-
tomer's sophistication and experience in securities transactions"
and which shows the degree of the customer's reliance upon the
broker's recommendations. 4 Some courts have found that the requi-
site control existed if the broker-customer relationship was one of
special trust and confidence. 5 Other courts have required the exist-
ence of a fiduciary relationship. 6 There seems to be little distinction
between the existence of special trust and confidence and the exist-
ence of a fiduciary relationship, as the courts generally look to the
same factors in determining the existence of each.
In Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine,7 the court held the
defendant-dealer liable for churning the plaintiff's account. The
plaintiff was a housewife with no business training. After graduating
from high school, she attended a girls' finishing school and married
a portrait artist. In finding the plaintiff to be utterly naive and
7. Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F.Supp. 429 (E.D.Pa. 1972).
8. Cf. Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 95,021, at
97,581 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). A formally discretionary account is one in which the broker has
expressly been given control of the transactions of that account.
9. Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865 (1946).
10. Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F.Supp. 1364, 1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202
(9th Cir. 1970).
11. Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F.Supp. 1364, 1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
12. Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir.
1974).
13. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 1974); Newburger, Loeb & Co.,
v. Gross, 365 F.Supp. 1364, 1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
14. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
15. Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp. 836, 846 (E.D. Va. 1968).
16. Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F.Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1972); see also
Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974); Stevens
v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
17. 288 F.Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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unsophisticated in financial matters, the court relied on the plain-
tiff's answer when questioned about the difference between stocks
and bonds-"stocks have names and bonds don't."' 8
In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.," the plaintiff was a widow
who had attended a teachers college for two years. The broker and
his wife had befriended the plaintiff after her husband's death, and
their relationship was both business and social. In finding that the
defendant had churned the plaintiff's account, the court stated that
the defendant had induced the plaintiff to place complete confid-
ence in him."°
These cases involve plaintiffs who had not completed college
and had little or no business experience. However, the real test is
not the plaintiff's general education and business experience.
Rather, it involves the plaintiff's sophistication in securities trans-
actions. It is conceivable for the customer to be well-educated and
experienced in business and yet still have the element of control
present. For example, in Weiser v. Shwartz,1' the plaintiff was a
member of the advisory committee of an insurance company and
the advisory board of a local bank. Nevertheless, the court found
that he was unsophisticated as an investor. The court stated that
customers, in general, are peculiarly dependent on the professional
knowledge and skill of brokers.
If a customer, who is experienced in trading and not subject to
undue influence, confirms the allegedly excessive trading as being
consistent with his own speculative desires, the requisite element of
control does not exist.2" In Nash v. J. Arthur Warren & Co.,2 the
plaintiffs failed to establish that the broker controlled their
accounts. The court noted that the plaintiffs were far from unso-
phisticated in stock transactions and they did not simply rely on the
18. Id. at 838. In Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365 (lst Cir. 1973), the
court accepted the jury's finding of control, although it was ultimately held that the evidence
was insufficient to support a finding of excessive trading. The plaintiff was a high school
graduate, who had engaged in the insulating, painting, and carpentry contracting business
and later became president of a corporation earning an annual salary of $15,000-$25,000.
19. 283 F.Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
20. Id. at 426.
21. 286 F.Supp. 389 (E.D. La. 1968). In this case, the court held that the plaintiff's
cause of action for churning was not barred by the statute of limitation because the plaintiff
had not discovered the fraud. Although this case is not directly on point as to whether the
defendant controlled the plaintiffs account, the portion of the opinion which considers the
plaintiff's sophistication seems relevant. But cf. Hayden, Stone, Inc. v. Brown, 218 So.2d 230
(Fla. App. 1969).
22. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F.Supp. 373 (S.D.
Tex. 1965); see Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1050 (7th Cir. 1974).
23. 137 F.Supp. 615 (D. Mass. 1955).
1975]
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representations of the broker.24
Transactions which were truly initiated by the customer are
evidence that the broker did not control the customer's account.25
However, if the customer initiates transactions as a result of reliance
on the broker's recommendations, then mere initiation by the cus-
tomer does not refute the broker's control .2 Asking the customer's
permission is a futile gesture where the customer does not under-
stand the nature of the transactions 27 and where the customer places
special trust and confidence in the broker's recommendations. 8
B. The Element of Excessive Trading
Once the control element has been established, it must also be
shown that the broker abused this control through excessive trading
of the account. 29 The essential question is whether the volume and
frequency of the transactions were "excessive" in light of the nature
of the account and the needs and objectives of the customer." No
precise test has been formulated for determining whether an ac-
count was excessively traded.3 1 However, certain factors have been
considered in making the determination:
1. The nature of the account. The investment objectives of a
customer are an important standard against which to measure ex-
cessiveness.32 A larger number of transactions are generally needed
to find excessiveness in respect to a trading account, where the
purpose is to generate profits from trading, than with respect to an
24. In a companion case, this same court failed to find the defendant controlled the
plaintiff's account because the plaintiff was fully apprised of the number and frequency of
the transactions in her account. Carr v. Warner, 137 F.Supp. 618 (D. Mass. 1955). Subse-
quent cases indicate, however, that simply because the customer knows the number and
frequency of the transactions does not necessarily mean that the broker did not control the
account. See cases cited note 126 infra. The real question is not whether the customer was
fully apprised of the transactions, but whether the customer was sophisticated enough to
know that his account was being traded excessively.
25. Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F.Supp. 1364, 1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Thomson
v. Karn, 35 S.E.C. 451 (1953). See also Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F.Supp. 429
(E.D. Pa. 1972); 3 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 1479-80.
26. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); accord, Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp. 836,
839 (E.D. Va. 1968).
27, Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,621 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
28. Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr.
222 (1968). This element of control is intertwined with the defense of waiver and estoppel.
29. Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Services, 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970).
30. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
31. Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Services, 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970).
32. Fey v. Waston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 40
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investment account, where profits are to be derived from dividends
and long-term capital appreciation.3
In a commodities account, a large number of transactions is
expected, because of the high volatility of the commodity market. 4
Nevertheless, excessive trading can exist in a commodities account.
Where the broker handling a securities account induces a customer
to open a commodities account to provide an additional opportunity
for generating commissions, the commodity account may be re-
garded as a mere device for churning the securities account.35
2. The turn-over rate. This test compares the total cost of
purchases during a given time period to the amount of the original
investment. 6 In Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine," the turn-over
averaged an equivalent of more than two times a year. The court
held that this was clearly excessive. In Hecht v. Harris, Upham &
Co.,3 the turn-over rate was between 8.05 and 11.5 for a period of
six years and ten months. This was held to be evidence of churning."
3. In-and-out trading. Another consideration in determining
excessiveness is the presence of a pattern of in-and-out trading. In-
and-out trading is a sale of part or all of a customer's portfolio with
the proceeds immediately reinvested in other securities followed by
the sale of the newly acquired securities in a short period of time.'
Another type of transaction which is condemned is the so-called
"reversal." Reversal occurs when certain securities are sold and then
repurchased in a short period of time. 2
33. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 432 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). In Walter S. Grubbs, 28 S.E.C. 323, 329 (1948), it was held
that excessive trading may be established by fewer transactions, if the account was of a non-
speculative nature. A trading account can, however, be churned even though the number of
transactions is small. The churning occurs when the broker trades solely to generate commis-
sions without considering whether the trade is beneficial to the customer. Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 432 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970);
see Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,021, at 97,581 (S.D. N.Y.
1975).
34. Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Services, 430 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir. 1970).
35. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 437 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
36. Id. at 435. See also R.H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467 (1955); Behel, Johnsen &
Co., 26 S.E.C. 163 (1947).
37. 288 F.Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
38. Id. at 842.
39. 283 F.Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
40. Id. at 436.
41. Id. at 435. See also Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp. 836, 846 (E.D.
Va. 1968).
42. R.H. Johnson & Co., 33 S.E.C. 180 (1951), afi'd, 198 F.2d 690 (2nd Cir. 1952),
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4. The holding period of the respective securities. The length
of time for which each security was held is important in determining
whether the account has been excessively traded. 43 However, the
holding period must be considered in light of whether the account
is for investment or trading purposes. In Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor
& Paine," in holding for the plaintiff, the court noted that 85 per
cent of the securities were held less than six months, 70 per cent
ninety days or less, and 39 per cent thirty days or less.45
5. The broker's profit. If the broker's profit is large compared
to the amount of the original investment, such evidence supports an
allegation of "churning."" Also, in Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor &
Paine,47 the finding of churning was supported by the fact that the
commissions from the customer's account represented a major por-
tion of the broker's earnings. In that case, this figure exceeded 40
per cent in at least two years. 8 In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 4
39 per cent of the broker's commissions were earned from the plain-
tiff's account."
6. Opinion of an expert witness. As a result of certain recent
cases in which a verdict has been directed for the dealer-defendant,
it seems mandatory for the plaintiff to produce an expert witness.
The expert witness must analyze the above factors and conclude
that the account was excessively traded." If the fact finder is pre-
sented with the raw data concerning the plaintiff's transactions and
no expert opinion is offered, the court may easily find for the defen-
dant as a matter of law.2 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, in affirming a directed verdict for the defendant dealer in
an action for churning a commodities account, stated that the jury
43. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
44. 288 F.Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
45. Id. at 840. The court stated that the purpose of the account was not active trading.
A more active account was involved in Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 436
(N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970), where the court noted that 82% of
the securities were held less than a year, 67% were held less than nine months, and 45% were
held less than six months. The court relied upon this evidence in finding that the defendant
had churned the plaintiff's account.
46. E. H. Rollins & Sons, 18 S.E.C. 347, 381 (1945).
47. 288 F.Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
48. Id. at 840.
49. 283 F.Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
50. Id. at 436. In Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949), the
plaintiff's gross trading profit was $53,000, while the defendant's gross commissions were
$530,000. Such evidence supported the finding of churning.
51. See, e.g., Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1973); Booth v.
Peavey Co. Commodity Services, 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970).
52. Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 372 (1st Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 40
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had not been presented with any objective criteria for determining
churning. Since trading in commodity futures is a specialized field,
the mere fact of trading, standing alone, did not provide a sufficient
basis for submission to the jury 3
II. THEORETICAL BASES FOR PRIVATE REMEDIES
Until a few years ago, the Securities and Exchange Commission
dealt with the offense of churning through enforcement of the anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities acts. 4 Today, private ac-
tions seem to be the major deterrent against the offense of churn-
ing. 55
A. Liability Under the Federal Securities Acts56
Although the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
acts57 make no specific reference to a private right of action, private
actions for violations of these provisions have become well estab-
lished. 51 In acknowledging these causes of action, the courts have
taken it upon themselves to provide such remedies as are necessary
to make effective the congressional purpose of the acts. 9
One of the principal congressional purposes of the federal secur-
ities acts was to protect the investor in a highly sophisticated securi-
ties field. ° It is essential that the highest ethical standards prevail
in every facet of the securities industry.6' A broker who is guilty of
the offense of churning a customer's account violates section 17(a)
53. Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Services, 430 F.2d 132, 135 (8th Cir. 1970).
54. See Irish v. SEC, 367 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1966); Hersh v. SEC, 325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir.
1963); E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347 (1945).
55. See, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor, & Paine, 288 F.Supp.
836 (E.D. Va. 1968); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F.Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Twomey v. Mit-
chum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968).
56. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.a. § 77a et seq. (1970); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).
57. Securities Act of 1933, § 17a, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
58. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 423 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). See also Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389
U.S. 191 (1967); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411
F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967); Ellis v. Carter, 291
F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Matheson v. Armbust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960); Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F.Supp. 724, 730
(E.D. Pa. 1966); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F.Supp. 798, 800, 802-03 (E.D. Pa.
1946), modified, 83 F.Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
59. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964); cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684
(1946).
60. Cf. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1970).
61. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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of the Securities Act of 1933,62 section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,63 and Securities and Exchange Commission
Rule 10b-5.11 These violations may be the theoretical basis for a
private action, even though the plaintiff (customer) and defendant
(broker) are not in the classic buyer-seller relationship."
As with other fraud actions under the federal securities acts, the
above sections are not the sole basis for a private action.66 Churning
a customer's account is also a violation of section 15(c)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.67 Moreover, churning is a direct
violation of Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 15c-1-7,65
which, by its very terms, makes churning unlawful.6 The language
of rule 15c-1-7, which specifically prohibits "transactions which are
excessive in size or frequency," might indicate that all other statu-
tory prohibitions, which are more indirect, should be abandoned in
62. 16 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). The Securities Act of 1933 is concerned with the initial
distribution of securities rather than subsequent trading. L. Loss, SECuRITIE REGULATMON 130
(temp. student ed. 1961). Because churning is a problem involving subsequent trading, in a
technicgl sense there has been no violation of the 1933 Act. However, in pleading the case,
the plaintiff-customer will allege all possible statutory violations and the courts simply find
that the broker has churned the account without specifying the statutory violations. See
Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp. 836, 843 (E.D. Va. 1968); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 422 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970);
cf. Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); 3 L. Loss, supra note 4,
at 1480.
63. 16 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). See Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp. 836,
845 (E.D. Va. 1968); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 422, 423, 432 (N.D.
Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1970); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F.Supp. 724
(E.D. Pa. 1966); Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,621 (S.D.
Cal. 1965); Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 690, 69 Cal.Rptr.
222 (1968); 6 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 3679 (Supp. 1969).
64. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973), for cases which hold that churning is a violation
of rule 10b-5; see also cases cited note 63 supra.
65. Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 444 (2d Cir. 1971); Lorenz v.
Watson, 258 F.Supp. 724, 732 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
66. See ALI, INTRODUCTORY MEMORANDUM TO FEDERAL SECURIES CODE, at xv (Tentative
Draft No. 2, March, 1973).
67, 15 U.S.C. § 780(c)(1) (1970); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp.
836 (E.D. Va. 1968); see Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 431 (N.D. Cal.
1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F.Supp. 724, 734 (E.D.
Pa. 1966); Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,621, at 95,321 (S.D.
Cal. 1965).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7. For cases which stand for the proposition that churning
violates rule 15cl-7, see cases cited note 67 supra. See also 3 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 1479.
69. Rule 15c.1-7(a) states:
The term "manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent device or contrivance," as
used in section 15(c) of the act, is hereby defined to include any act of any broker
or dealer designed to effect with or for any customer's account in respect to which
such broker or dealer or his agent or employee is vested with any discretionary
power any transactions of purchase or sale which are excessive in size or frequency
in view of the financial resources and character of such account.
8
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favor of rule 15c-1-7. However, section 15(c)(1) of the 1934 Act and
rule 15c-1-7 have two majorlimitations. First, they are violated only
if the churning involves over-the-counter transactions.7" Second,
any action brought under section 15(c) (1) is governed by the statute
of limitations provided for in section 29(b) of the 1934 Act, whereas
the other anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities acts are gov-
erned by the applicable state statute of limitations for fraud. The
statute of limitations period begins to run when the churning fraud
is or should be discovered," and this is true whether the period for
the statute of limitations is controlled by federal statute or state
law.72 But in accordance with section 29(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934,13 all churning actions which are based on
section 15(c)(1) and rule 15c-1-7 must be brought within one year
after the discovery of the churning or within three years after the
churning occurs. 74 If, on the other hand, the action is based on the
70. See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 431 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F.Supp. 724, 734 (E.D. Pa.
1966).
71. Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 171 (10th Cir.
1974); Weiser v. Shwartz, 286 F.Supp. 389, 392 (E.D. La. 1968); 3 L. Loss, supra note 4, at
1775-76. The statute of limitations will not begin to run because the customer has knowledge
of all the transactions. He must at least have constructive knowledge that his account is being
churned. Knowledge of the transactions only puts the sophisticated investor on inquiry. See
Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 172 (10th Cir. 1974);
Weiser v. Shwartz, 286 F.Supp. 389, 392-93 (E.D. La. 1968).
72. Weiser v. Shwartz, 286 F.Supp. 389 (E.D. La. 1968); see Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S.
(22 Wall.) 342, 348 (1875).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970) states:
[Tihat no contract shall be deemed void by reason of this subsection in any action
maintained in reliance upon this subsection, by any person to or for whom any
broker or dealer sells, or from or for whom any broker or dealer purchases, a security
in violation of any rule or regulation prescribed pursuant to paragraph (1) of
subsection (c) of section 78o of this title, unless such action is brought within one
year after the discovery that such sale or purchase involves such violation and
within three years after such violation.
74. Newburger, Loeb & Co., Inc. v. Gross, 365 F.Supp. 1364, 1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F.Supp. 724, 734 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Both the Newburger and Lorenz
cases applied the statute of limitations period of § 29(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 to a cause of action for money damages even though § 29(b) speaks only of an action
which voids a contract in violation of § 15(c)(1). In Newburger, the federal district court held
that the distinction between tort and contract theory was not determinative, citing Golden-
berg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1959). See also Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, 40
F.Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). But, in Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 441-
42 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970), the court, in dictum, stated that
the statute of limitations period in § 29(b) of the 1934 Act applied only to actions to declare
contracts void. Moreover, in Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp. 836, 845
(E.D.Va. 1968), the court held that § 29(b) did not apply to the plaintiff's churning action,
even though one of the counts was an alleged violation of § 15(c)(1) of the 1934 Act. Hence,
it is unclear whether the statute of limitations for a churning action based on § 15(c)(1) is
9
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other anti-fraud provisions, the controlling statute of limitation is
the same as that of the state in which the churning occurred. The
state limitations period is generally more liberal than the limitation
period in section 29(b) of the 1934 Act.7" As a result of these two
considerations section 15(c)(1), which directly prohibits churning,
can be used only if the securities churned were non-exchange securi-
ties and the action is brought within one year after the churning is
discovered or within three years after the churning occurs.
If the broker churns a commodity account, not only does the
customer have an action under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act,76 sec-
tion 10(b), and rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act,77 but there is also an
action based on section 6(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act.78
Such an action will withstand the defendant-dealer's contention
that there is no liability under the former anti-fraud sections be-
cause the commodity future is not a security.7 9
Federal courts, of course, have jurisdiction in a churning action
which is based on the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
acts."0 However, the petitioner should take care to plead specifically
the use of a means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in
accordance with the exact wording of the respective statute."' Since
a churning action is based on the anti-fraud provisions, the plaintiff
governed by § 29(b) of the 1934 Act, or whether, like the other anti-fraud provisions, it is
governed by the applicable state statute of limitations for fraud. See text accompanying note
76 infra.
75. Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 171 (10th Cir.
1974); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 441 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430
F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). In Dzenits, the two-year Oklahoma statute of limitations for fraud
applied to a "churning" action based on § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. In Hecht, the three-year
California statute of limitations for fraud applied to a churning action based on all the anti-
fraud sections of the federal securities acts except § 15(c)(1). See also Fratt v. Robinson, 203
F.2d 627, 634-35 (9th Cir. 1953); Weiser v. Shwartz, 286 F.Supp. 389, 391 (E.D. La. 1968).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 77ggg(a) (1970).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
78. Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F.Supp. 764, 765
(S.D,N.Y. 1972); Anderson v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 291 F.Supp. 705, 710 (D. Minn. 1968);
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 437 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d
1202 (9th Cir. 1970). See also Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Services, 430 F.2d 132, 133
(8th Cir. 1970).
79. Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F.Supp. 764, 765
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
80. Federal jurisdiction may be based on § 22 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.
§ 77yyy (1970)) and on § 27 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78gg
(1970)); see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 422
(N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1970).
81. Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F.Supp. 724, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1966). An intrastate telephone
call may be sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction. See Kerbs v. Fall River Industries, Inc.,
CCH FED, SEC. L. REP. 94,788, at 96,612 (10th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718,
727 (8th Cir. 1967).
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is required to plead fraud with particularity. 2 "Particularity" in
this context means that the pleading must give the defendant fair
notice of the claim asserted. 3 Common law fraud need not be al-
leged nor proven 4 and the burden of proof for churning under the
anti-fraud sections of the federal securities acts, unlike common law
fraud, is a "preponderance of the evidence standard." 5
B. Liability Under the N.A.S.D. and N. YS.E. Rules
Whether churning gives rise to a private action under the Na-
tional Association of Security Dealers (N.A.S.D.)-Suitability
Rule8 or rules 401 and 435 of the New York Stock Exchange 7
(N.Y.S.E.) is unclear. In Avern Trust v. Clarke," the seventh circuit
court of appeals in dictum stated that a private cause of action
could be based upon the rules of the N.A.S.D. and N.Y.S.E.9 How-
ever, in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,"o the second circuit
court of appeals stated that the courts cannot automatically imply
federal civil liability for a member's violation of exchange or dealer
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). For a discussion of how the particularity requirement is met,
see Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., CCH. FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,021, at 97,581 (S.D. N.Y.
1975).
83. Burkhart v. Allson Realty Trust, 363 F.Supp. 1286, 1289 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
84. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962).
85. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974); Hecht v. Harris, Upham
& Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp.
836, 845-46 (E.D. Va. 1968).
86. National Association of Securities Dealers, Rule of Fair Practice, Art. II §§ 1 and
2 states:
Section 1. A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high stan-
dards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.
Section 2. In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of
any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recom-
mendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed
by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation
and needs.
See Fishman, Broker-Dealer Obligations to Customers-The NASD Suitability Rule, 51
MINN. L. Rav. 233 (1966).
87. New York Stock Exchange Rule 401 states: "Every member, allied member and
member organization shall at all times adhere to the principles of good business practice in
the conduct of his or its business affairs." New York Stock Exchange Rule 435 states:
No member, member organization, partner or stockholder therein shall .. . (2)
execute or cause to be executed on the Exchange purchases or sales of any stock
for any account with respect to which he or it or another partner or stockholder
therein is vested with any discretionary power, which purchases or sales are exces-
sive in size or frequency in view of the financial resources in such account.
88. 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970).
89. See also Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th
Cir. 1969); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp. 836, 846 (E.D. Va. 1968).
90. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966).
1975]
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association rules. The test is whether the rule imposes a duty un-
known to common law. If such a duty is unknown at common law,
then liability could be implied." The court, in Colonial, con-
cluded that there was no private action on the basis of the
N.A.S.D.-Suitability Rule or on the basis of a N.Y.S.E. constitu-
tional provision similar to N.Y.S.E. Rule 401.92 The rationale of
Colonial has been followed in subsequent decisions 3 and it appears
that Colonial has received more support than Avern Trust. There-
fore, the N.A.S.D.-Suitability Rule and N.Y.S.E. Rules 401 and
435 might not support a private action for churning, but this result
is not absolutely certain. However, even in the cases affirming
Colonial, violations of such rules are at least evidence of churning. 4
C. Liability Under State Statutes and Common Law
Churning violates not only the anti-fraud provisions of the fed-
eral securities acts, but also violates the anti-fraud sections of the
state blue sky law. 5 Churning may also serve as a basis for an action
of common law fraud, or an action for a breach of a fiduciary obliga-
tion. The federal securities acts expressly preserve other rights and
remedies which may exist at law or in equity." Hence, an action
under a state statute or common law is appropriate and could be
joined with the federal anti-fraud actions under the concept of pen-
dent jurisdiction. 7
A churning action based on a state blue sky law is so similar to
an action based on the federal anti-fraud provisions" that any dis-
cussion would be repetitious. However, basing a churning action on
common law fraud or breach of a fiduciary obligation is a wholly
separate concept, and hence, must be considered separately.
91. Id. at 182.
92. New York Stock Exchange Constitution, art. XIV, § 6 (1968).
93. Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,021 (S.D. N.Y.
1975); Wells v. Blythe, 351 F.Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Mercury Investment Co. v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295 F.Supp. 1160, 1163 (S.D. Tex. 1969); cf. Hecht v. Harris, Upham
& Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 431 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970).
94. Cf. Mercury Investment Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295 F.Supp. 1160, 1163 (S.D.
Tex. 1969).
95. See, e.g., UNIFORM SEcurrIEs ACT §§ 101, 102; §§ 409.101, .102, RSMo 1969.
96. Securities Act of 1933, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77 p (1970); Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934, § 28a; 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970); see Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton,
Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968).
97. Kasner v. H. Hentz & Co., 475 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir. 1973); Jenny v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,021, at 97,582 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Mercury Invest-
ment Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295 F.Supp. 1160, 1163 (S.D. Tex. 1969); see also U.M.W.
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973).
98. UNIFORM SEcumrris ACr § 101, Comment .01.
[Vol. 40
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After examining the numerous violations of the federal securi-
ties acts which result from churning a customer's account, it might
appear that an action for common law fraud or breach of a fiduciary
obligation is both unnecessary and redundant. However, an action
under the federal securities acts does not allow the plaintiff to re-
cover punitive damages.9 Therefore, a prayer for punitive damages
must be based on an action at common law.
Even though the elements of common law fraud and deceit will
differ from state to state, the elements are, essentially, the follow-
ing: "There must be (1) a false representation of (2) a material (3)
fact; (4) the defendant must know of the falsity (scienter) but make
the statement nevertheless for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff
to rely on it; (5) the plaintiff must justifiably rely on it; and (6) the
plaintiff must have suffered damage as a consequence."'' 0
Unlike an action under the federal anti-fraud provisions, some
federal courts require the elements be proven by clear, cogent and
convincing evidence."0 ' An action for churning a customer's account
does not easily fit into the elements of common law fraud. The
broker probably made no positive representation. More than likely,
no representation was made at all. The only feasible way in which
the customer can meet the element of misrepresentation is to allege
either that the broker misrepresented himself when he held himself
out to the public, by impliedly promising to act in a fair and good
faith manner-the "shingle" theory,' 2 or that the broker misrepre-
sented himself in failing to tell the customer of the excess transac-
tions. Both of these allegations have problems associated with them.
In the former, the broker may have intended to act in good faith at
the inception of the relationship and hence, the representation was
in all respects true when made. In the latter, the only misrepresen-
tation is an omission; there was actually no representation made.
Churning may exist in the absence of common law fraud and, thus,
it is often difficult for the plaintiff to prove all fraud elements.0 3
99. See text accompanying note 155 infra.
100. Burkhart v. Allson Realty Trust, 363 F.Supp. 1286, 1291 (E.D. IM. 1973); see
Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222
(1968); Latta v. Robinson Erection Co., 363 Mo. 47, 59, 248 S.W.2d 569, 576 (En Bane 1952);
3 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 1431.
101. Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp. 836, 848 (E.D. Va. 1968).
102. Under the "shingle theory," the broker, by mounting his "shingle," makes the
broad representation that he will deal fairly with his customers and that such transactions
will be handled promptly in accordance with trade custom. Harvey H. Shields, Jr., 39 S.E.C.
608, 609 (1954); see concurring opinion of Clarke, J., in Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d
Cir. 1961); E. WEIss, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS 171 (1965).
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To alleviate the proof problems caused by the stringent
requirements of common law fraud, the customer may resort to an
allegation of constructive fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. Al-
though the term "constructive fraud" is elusive, some courts have
said that constructive fraud arises on a breach of a duty by one in a
confidential or fiduciary relationship to another which induces justi-
fiable reliance by the latter to his detriment. 4 Therefore, whether
churning gives rise to an action for constructive fraud or breach of
a fiduciary obligation depends on whether the broker-customer rela-
tionship is one of special confidence and trust.
A confidential relationship exists when one relies upon and
trusts another in regard to the handling of property and business
affairs.' 5 A real estate broker, as the agent of his customer, is in a
fiduciary relationship with his customer. This relationship imposes
on the real estate broker the obligations of frankness, full and com-
plete disclosure of all material facts, loyalty, and the obligation to
exercise the utmost good faith and fidelity toward his customer.' 6
Some courts have stated that the relationship between a stock-
broker and his customer is also that of a fiduciary, imposing upon
the broker the duty of acting in the highest good faith towards the
customer. 7 Other courts have said that the mere existence of a
broker-customer relationship is not absolute proof of a fiduciary
relationship.' 8 However, in the context of an action for churning, it
makes no difference whether the mere existence of a broker-
customer relationship gives rise to a fiduciary relationship. By defi-
nition, one of the elements of a churning action is that the broker
controlled the customer's account. If this element is satisfied, a
104. Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 711, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 222, 237 (1968); Winchell v. Gaskill, 354 Mo. 593, 190 S.W.2d 266 (1945); Hockenberry
v. Cooper County State Bank, 338 Mo. 31, 88 S.W.2d 1031 (1935); 32 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and
Deceit, § 441 (1967).
105. Davis v. Pitti, 472 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. 1971). See also Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones &
Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968); Wilhoit v. Fite, 341 S.W.2d
806 (Mo. 1960); 3 POMEROY, EQurry JURISPRUDENCE §§ 955-63 (5th ed. 1941); 1 Scorr, TRUSTS
§ 2.5 (1939).
106. Tavagliante v. J.W. Wood Realty Co., 425 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. 1968); Martin v.
Hieken, 340 S.W.2d 161 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960).
107. Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 846 (E.D. Va. 1968);
Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 709, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222
(1968). See also Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 440 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (dictum); R.H. Johnson, 33 S.E.C. 180, aff'd, 198 F.2d
690 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 855 (1952); Leuzinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 396 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. En Banc. 1965) (dictum).
108. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974); Avern Trust v. Clarke,
415 F.2d 1238, 1240 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970).
[Vol. 40
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confidential and fiduciary relationship should be found."9 There-
fore, if the broker did churn his customer's account, an action of
constructive fraud and/or breach of a fiduciary duty should exist,
since the control element of churning is proof that the relationship
between the broker and his customer was one of special confidence
and trust.
1I. LIABILITY OF THE BROKERAGE FIRM
"A stock brokerage firm can act only through its various part-
ners, employees and agents and the acts of its employees and
agents, in the course of their employment are the acts of the firm."'10
The liability of the brokerage firm under the Securities Act of
1933, state blue sky law, and common law actions will be deter-
mined by the general principle of respondeat superior."' However,
the liability of the brokerage firm under the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 is expressly provided for and controlled by sec-
tion 20 of the Act.' Section 20 states that a controlling person shall
be jointly and severally liable to the same extent the controlled
person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith."3
In the absence of the good faith defense, a brokerage firm will be
liable under the 1934 Act if a broker-employee churns a customer's
account."' Section 20 imposes liability even though the law of
agency does not impose such liability."' In meeting the require-
ments of the good faith defense, it is necessary for the brokerage firm
to show that some precautionary measures were taken to prevent
the injury suffered."' It is the duty of a brokerage firm to maintain
and enforce adequate supervision,"7 and where the firm fails to
109. See Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168,172 (10th
Cir. 1974).
110. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 443 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
111. SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
880 (1972); Blackburn v. Witter, 201 Cal. App. 2d 518, 19 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1962). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 261, 262 (1958).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1052 (7th Cir. 1974).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 7St(a) (1970).
114. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 443 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified
on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 1970); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F.Supp. 724,
732 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 880 (1972); Gordon v. Barr, 366 F.Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); 3 L. Loss, supra note
4, at 1808.
115. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974).
116. Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F.Supp. 724, 732 (E.D. Pa. 1966); accord, Gordon v. Barr,
366 F.Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 443 (N.D.
Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 1970).
117. Winkler v. SEC, 377 F.2d 517, 518 (2d Cir. 1967).
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maintain and diligently enforce a proper system of supervision and
internal control, such failure results in a violation of the anti-fraud
provisions of the 1934 Act."'
In considering what supervision and internal control is neces-
sary to satisfy the "good faith" requirement, the following advice
may be helpful. On approving a new account the brokerage firm
should get the following customer information-citizenship, age,
occupation, estimate of net worth and income, bank or credit refer-
ence, investment objectives, previous investment experience, and
type of account.' In supervising existing accounts and the trading
therein, the brokerage firm should watch carefully for excessive
trading in accounts of investors who are inexperienced in securities
transactions.
IV. DEFENSES
A. Profit as a Defense
That the customer's account makes an overall profit is not a
defense to a churning action. 2 ' If the account is excessively traded,
the charge of the additional commissions against the account's prof-
itability results in a profit which is smaller than it would have been,
absent the excessive trading.
B. The Defense of Waiver and Estoppel
The purpose of the federal securities acts is to protect the inno-
cent investor, not an investor who loses his innocence and then waits
to see how his investment turns out before deciding to invoke the
provisions of the acts.' To create an estoppel, some reliant change
in position by the one claiming the estoppel is essential. Waiver
presupposes knowledge of one's rights and an intent to relinquish
them. 22
In churning actions, the concepts of waiver and estoppel are
often synonymous with the element of control; a separate treatment
118. Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902 (1960).
119. NYSE Rule 405; NYSE booklet, Supervision and Management of Registered Rep-
resentatives and Customer Accounts 7-9 (1967); NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, §
21(b); Securities and Exchange Act § 15b, 17 C.F.R. 240.15b10-3 (1973).
120. Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp. 836, 847 (E.D. Va. 1968); Hecht
v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th
Cir. 1970). See Comment, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARv. L. REv. 869, 878 (1967).
121. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1962). See Hecht
v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1970).
122. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1050 (7th Cir. 1974). See also Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 40
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of the concepts maybe somewhat confusing.ss However, since most
courts treat the element, of control separately from the defense of
waiver and estoppel, they will be treated separately here.2
The defenses of waiver and estoppel are clearly applicable to a
churning action if the customer knows of the excessive transactions
and is sophisticated and experienced enough in securities transac-
tions to know that the number of transactions is excessive.125 Such
evidence would also indicate that the broker does not control the
customer's account.
Merely because a customer receives confirmation slips does not,
however, mean that he is precluded from bringing an action for
churning because of the waiver and estoppel defenses. 2 ' The real
question, with regard to waiver and estoppel, is not whether the
customer knew of each transaction, but whether the customer was
experienced and sophisticated enough to understand that the fre-
quency and volume were excessive. In Hecht v. Harris, Upham &
Co.,127 the court pointed out this distinction. The court held that
even though the customer was estopped from complaining about the
suitability of the transactions, the customer was not estopped from
complaining that her account was churned by excessive transac-
tions.2' Churning is conduct which is not common in the experience
of the ordinary individual and it is, consequently, not easily recog-
nizable to unsophisticated investors. 29
V. DAMAGES
A. Actual Damages
Three measures of recovery have been sought in actions for
churning: the quasi-contractual theory, the "out-of-pocket" theory,
and the "loss of bargain" theory.1 3
123. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 1974).
124. See text accompanying note 7 supra, for a discussion of the element of control.
125. Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 374 (1st Cir. 1973). See Royal Air
Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Nash v. J. Arthur Warner & Co., 137
F.Supp. 615 (D. Mass. 1955); Carr v. Warner, 137 F.Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1955).
126. Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 172 (10th
Cir. 1974); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. RP.
91,621, at 95,320 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
127. 283 F.Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
128. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
129. Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 172 (10th
Cir. 1974).
130. Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp. 836, 849 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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1. The quasi-contractual theory. The majority of churning
cases invoke the quasi-contractual theory for determining damages.
According to this theory, the customer is allowed to recover all the
commissions paid to the broker. In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,131
the trial court allowed the plaintiff to recover the commissions paid
and interest thereon, in addition to the loss of dividends and princi-
pal which allegedly resulted from the broker's churning of the cus-
tomer's account. However, the court of appeals reversed the dam-
ages portion of the trial court's decision, and limited damages to
commissions paid to the broker and interest thereon. The appeals
court held that the customer was estopped from complaining of the
quality of the advice given by the broker, and thus could not re-
cover the lost dividends and principal.3 2
In Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine,"' the court held that the
proper measure of damages was the broker's commissions, plus the
transfer tax charge, plus the amount of capital gains taxes incurred
from the defendant's churning.'34 At first glance, the awarding of
capital gains tax paid by the customer seems inappropriate, since
the tax on capital gains only diminishes the customer's gain and
causes him no actual loss. However, one possible rationale for allow-
ing recovery of capital gains tax paid is grounded on the assumption
that had the account not been excessively traded, the gain might
have been long-term capital gain instead of short-term capital
gain, '3 or might not have been recognized at all. 3'
2. The "out-of-pocket" theory. The out-of-pocket theory al-
lows the customer to recover the difference between the amount of
his original investment and dividends therefrom, less any amounts
received by the customer and the ending value of the account.'37
This measure of damage presents a problem where there has been
churning of an account which makes an overall net profit, as the
131. 283 F.Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
132. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1211 (9th Cir. 1970).
133. 288 F.Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
134. Id. at 851.
135. Where the broker purchases and sells securities on behalf of the customer within
a six month period and a capital gain is realized, the gain is short-term capital gain. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 1222(1). If the securities had been held longer than six months, the gain would
be long-term capital gain and the customer would be entitled to a long-term capital gain
deduction. INT. RsV. CODE OF 1954, § 1202.
136. By holding appreciated securities until death, all appreciation goes untaxed. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1014(a).
137. Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 730, 69 Cal.
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calculated damages would be zero.' Since there has been no actual
loss, this may be the desired result. However, such a rule ignores the
possibility that had the account not been churned, the ending value
of the account would have reflected a large profit. Moreover, the rule
assumes that all transactions were improper.' In addition, the rule
allows recovery for bad advice as well as excessive trading damages.
3. The "loss of bargain" theory. The final theory which the
courts have recognized allows the plaintiff to recover the difference
between the amount his account would have been if it had been
properly managed and the actual ending balance."' This measure
of damages requires that the plaintiff produce an expert to testify
concerning the amount the account would have been, absent churn-
ing. Some courts have said that the loss of bargain theory lends itself
to speculation and conjecture.' However, other courts have sug-
gested that because the broker's improper management caused the
loss, he is not in a position to complain about the speculation112
In determining a proper measure of damages for a churning
action, there appear to be two competing considerations. First, the
customer must be compensated for his actual losses. Secondly, the
customer should not be awarded damages based upon speculation
and conjecture. As to the first consideration, logically, damages
should be awarded with respect to only those transactions which
were excessive. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to deter-
mine which transactions were excessive.
In formulating a proper measure of damages, the quasi-
contractual rule is a good starting point. Under this measure of
damages, the plaintiff could recover all commissions paid to the
broker, less those commissions which the broker could prove did not
result from excessive trading. The advantage of this rule is that it
is simple, and in this respect, eliminates some of the speculation.
However, the rule also precludes the customer from recouping losses
which would not have been incurred, absent churning. In some in-
stances, transactions entered into by the broker may result in losses
in the value of the traded securities themselves. It seems that the
plaintiff should be able to recover these losses also. The out-of-
pocket measure of damages takes these losses into account. How-
ever, the out-of-pocket theory does not discriminate between losses
138. This assumes that the dividends from such an original account are less than or
equal to the net profit.
139. Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp. 836, 849 (E.D. Va. 1968).
140. Id. at 849.
141. Id.
142. See Comment, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARv. L. REv. 869, 885 (1967).
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caused by excessive trading and losses from unsound advice. As
with commissions generated by excessive transactions, the proper
approach might be to presume that all- losses resulted from excessive
trading, and reduce this amount to the extent that the broker could
prove that the losses were not caused by excessive transactions. In
summary, the customer should be able to recover commissions on
the excessive transactions, and any losses incurred as a result of the.
excessive trading of securities.
A special measure of damages has been applied when the
churning action is based on a breach of fiduciary obligation.' The
customer may recover (1) any loss in value of the account, (2) any
profit made by the dealer, and (3) any profit which would have
accrued, but for the breach. " '
In some cases, attorney's fees have been allowed, as where a
broker's conduct has been vexatious or groundless or where he has
been guilty of overreaching conduct or bad faith.15 However, in
Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine,'46 the court stated that the
interest of justice did not require the awarding of counsel fees. 47
B. Punitive Damages
It has long been recognized that the investing public needs
special protection in this specialized field.' The practice of churn-
ing a customer's account is deserving of the severest condemnation.
"Its very nature brands it one of the most injurious types of fraud
possible. Its perpetrators prey on unwary and inexperienced inves-
tor [sic], since it is they who most frequently divest themselves of
complete control of their resources and place absolute trust and
confidence in their fiduciaries."'4 The purpose of punitive damages
is to indemnify the plaintiff,5 0 punish the defendant,"5' and deter
others from similar conduct.'52
143. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
144. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 205 (1935).
145. Bradley v. School Board, 53 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Va. 1971).
146. 288 F.Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
147. Id, at 849.
148. Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F.Supp. 724, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
149. Id. at 733.
150. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Electronic Concepts, Inc., 325 F.Supp. 1209, 1218 (E.D. Va.
1970); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp. 836, 848 (E.D. Va. 1968).
151. Beggs v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 409 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1966); Polk v.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R., 351 Mo. 865, 174 S.W.2d 176 (1943); Wisner v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
465 S.W.2d 666 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971); Peak v. W.T. Grant Co., 386 S.W.2d 685 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1965); Wehrman v. Liberty Petroleum Co., 382 S.W.2d 56 (St.L. Mo. App. 1964); State
ex rel. Boswell v. Curtis, 334 S.W.2d 757 (Spr. Mo. App. 1960).
152. See cases in notes 150 and 151 supra.
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Where an action is brought pursuant to the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934, section 28(a) of the Act is directed at the issue
of recoveries in excess of actual losses.'53 A few courts have construed
section 28(a) as only prohibiting double recovery, and not prohibit-
ing recovery of punitive damages.154 However, the majority of the
courts have construed section 28(a) as barring the recovery of puni-
tive damages under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.15 The
Securities Act of 1933 does not have a provision which could be
construed to expressly prevent recovery of punitive damages. Never-
theless, it has been held that punitive damages cannot be recovered
under the 1933 Act.156
Because punitive damages are not recoverable under the federal
securities acts, the question arises whether punitive damages are
recoverable under common law actions. The overwhelming majority
of courts have held that punitive damages, if appropriate, are per-
missable in an action based on common law.5' State law will, of
course, control, but it seems clear that punitive damages are re-
coverable for common law fraud. 5' As discussed previously, how-
ever, an action for common law fraud is not particularly suited in a
churning situation.'59 Hence, the customer, in attempting to recover
punitive damages, may choose to base his action on a breach of a
153. Section 28(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 states:
[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this
title shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total
amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of.
154. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 444 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (dictum). See Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F.Supp.
836, 848 (E.D. Va. 1968) (dictum); Nagel v. Prescott & Co., 36 F.R.D. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
155. Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 45 (10th Cir. 1971); deHaas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 1970); Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238,
1241 (7th Cir. 1969); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967) (dictum); Burkhart v. Allson
Realty Trust, 363 F.Supp. 1286, 1290 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re Caesars Palace Securities Litiga-
tion, 360 F.Supp. 366, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
156. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1267, 1283-87 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); accord, Burkhart v. Alson Realty Trust, 363 F.Supp. 1286, 1290
(N.D. IM. 1973). See also Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1241 (7th Cir. 1969) (dictum).
157. Flaks v. Koegel, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,803, at 96,669 (2d Cir. 1974); Coffee
v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973);
Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1337-38 (10th Cir. 1972); Burkhart v. Allson Realty Trust,
363 F.Supp. 1286, 1290-91 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re Caesars Palace Securities Litigation, 360
F.Supp. 366, 393-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Gann v. Bernz Omatic Corp., 262 F.Supp. 301, 304
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); 6 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 3781-83 (Supp. 1969); contra, Schaefer v. First
National Bank, 326 F.Supp. 1186, 1193 (N.D. M11. 1970).
158. Flaks v. Koegel, CCH F. SEc. L. REP. 94,803, at 96,664 (2d Cir. 1974); Burkhart
v. Alison Realty Trust, 363 F.Supp. 1286,1291 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re Caesars Palace Securities
Litigation, 360 F.Supp. 366, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
159. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
19751
21
et al.: Private Actions for the Broker's
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1975
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
fiduciary obligation.'
In Brown v. Coates,6' the plaintiffs brought an action against
a real estate broker for his breach of trust in a real estate transac-
tion. In holding that the plaintiffs could recover punitive damages,
the court said that the defendant-broker owed the plaintiffs the
obligation of fair dealing and full disclosure. 162 The principles of this
case are analogous to a churning action. It seems that punitive
damages should also be allowed against a stockbroker. Even though
the broker may be subject to disciplinary proceedings, 63 without
punitive damages recovery may very well be limited to the broker's
commissions resulting from the excessive trading.'64 Immunity from
punitive damages might be an incentive to churn a customer's ac-
count, because damages would be limited to the commissions gener-
ated from excessive trading.
Under Missouri law, if punitive damages are awarded against
the broker, they are also recoverable against the brokerage firm. 66
Moreover, in Missouri, churning is an intentional tort and, as such,
serves as a basis for punitive damages. 6'
VI. CONCLUSION
As long as the securities industry bases the amount of com-
pensation paid to dealers upon the number of transactions per
account,' the motivation for churning a customer's account will
continue. To avoid a churning action, the broker should fully dis-
close all transactions. The broker should also disclose that the
160. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
161. 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
162. [O]nce it has been shown that one trained and experienced holds him-
self out to the public as worthy to be trusted for hire to perform services for others,
and those so invited do place their trust and confidence, and that trust is intention-
ally and consciously disregarded, and exploited for unwarranted gain, community
protection, as well as that of the victim, warrants the imposition of punitive dam-
ages. . . . Punitive damages are particularly apt in such circumstances because
they both punish the wrongdoer, and offer the wronged a greater incentive to bring
derelicts to justice a process which can subject the victim to considerable expense
and trouble.
253 F.2d at 40.
163. Comment, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARv. L. REv. 869, 879-82 (1967).
164. This assumes the damages are based on a quasi-contractual theory. See text ac-
companying note 131 supra.
165. See Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 920 (1973).
166. Tietjens v. General Motors Corp., 418 S.W.2d 75, 88 (Mo. 1967). See also Webb
Agency, Inc. v. Commercial Standard Insurance Co., 333 F.Supp. 966 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
167. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. § 10.01 (2d ed. 1969).
168. H.R. Doc. No. 95, pt. 5, § 25-1(b)6, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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trade may be considered excessive for the customer's investment
sophistication and his investment objectives. If it is possible that a
transaction is excessive, the transaction should be initiated only
after full disclosure of the possible excessiveness and after obtain-
ing the written consent of the customer. The brokerage firm should
maintain a diligent policy of supervision and internal control.
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